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Islam in Indonesian television, 1962 to 1998
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Abstract: This article traces the changes in the representation of  Islam on
Indonesian television before the rise of  Islamic themes in the early 2000s. By
understanding the televised manifestations of  Islam relative to the ruling power
within the television system, one can see that as long ago as the 1970s Islamic
culture already enjoyed a privileged position in television content. Long before the
more recent trend of  ‘Islamic commodification’, state interest and business logic had
gradually set precedents for how Islam is manifested in the commercial system
today.
This article explores the representation of  Islam in Indonesian
television from the advent of  television in 1962 to the end of  the
authoritarian rule in 1998. It traces the ways in which Islam was
represented before the current proliferation of  Islamic imagery which
is motivated by commercial interests and feeds into the growing trend
of  Islamisation (Subijanto 2011; Rakhmani 2013). Since the late 1990s,
‘various currents that reject modernist, liberal or progressive re-
interpretations of  Islamic teachings and adhere to established doctrines
and social order’ have entered the mainstream of  Indonesian society
generally, including sectors such as finance and law (van Bruinessen
2013:16, see also Fealy and White 2008). The purpose of  this paper is
to understand Islamic representations before 1998, which has been
seen as the moment of  the ‘conservative turn’ in Indonesian Islam (van
Bruinessen 2011; 2013). It shows that, long before the
commodification of  Islam in Indonesian television, those in power
treated Islamic culture as political commodity.
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In 1962, Indonesia’s first television station, the state-owned
Television of  the Republic of  Indonesia (Televisi Republik Indonesia
— TVRI), was established as a public broadcasting service (Kitley
2000; Sen and Hill 2000). For good reasons, canonical works on
Indonesian television have been focused on revealing how the
authoritarian New Order regime between 1965 and 1998 used
television for a ‘national culture project’ (Kitley 2000:3; Sen and Hill
2000). The choice of  cultural material which was included and
excluded from television was, for decades, carefully designed to portray
the nation in the interests of  the state. In a country with roughly 6000
inhabited islands, 240 million citizens, 300 ethnic groups, 740 languages
and dialects, and 6 religious groups acknowledged by the state,1 such a
strategy was perhaps necessary. Thus, for a great part of  Indonesia’s
first thirty years of  television, the medium was useful to construct
images designed to tame cultural and religious tensions.
Televised representation of  national identity, based on the
country’s motto Bhinneka tunggal ika (Many and varied, but one, or
Unity in diversity), should ideally include every ‘sub-national identity’
that exists within its boundaries (Anderson 1999). Indonesian
television content, however, regardless of  the ruling regime or the
economic system, has catered more attentively to the needs of  the
majority Muslim audience, compared with those of  other religious
groups. Likewise, scholars studying Islam in Indonesia have
commented on the particular policies adopted by each administration
to negotiate the place of  Islam within the national identity (Liddle
1996; Hefner 1997; Hefner 2000; Azra 2006). 
In this article, I describe the three stages in how Islam was
represented in Indonesian television format and content as an
extension of  state ideology and commercial interest between 1962 and
the fall of  Suharto in 1998. The first section briefly explains the advent
of  Indonesia’s first state-owned television station TVRI in 1962. It
describes the conceptualisation of  TVRI during the Guided
Democracy period. The second section looks at how TVRI’s
programming strategy placed Islamic content during Indonesia’s single
state television system from 1965 to 1989. This strategy was
significantly related to the New Order national integration programme
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as can be seen in TVRI’s then slogan ‘TVRI weaves together our unity
and the union’ (menjalin persatuan dan kesatuan; Sen and Hill 2000:108).
The third section discusses the ways in which commercial television
stations represented Islam under authoritarian rule from 1989 to 1998).
This section describes how commercial television stations began to
reach out to the large Muslim audience by means of  producing ‘the
least objectionable programme’ (Klein and Morgensen 1979; Cantor
1971) and ‘deep risk aversion’ (Barkin 2004:5). Thus, the
mainstreaming of  Islam in Indonesian television can actually be traced
back to the early days of  the New Order, when precedents were set for
how Islam is manifested in the more recent commercial system. 
Early TVRI, 1962 to 1965
In the early decades of  the Republic, nationalism was the dominant
political philosophy, with President Sukarno its chief  promoter.
According to Pringle (2010:65) there were six key episodes in the
Sukarno era that helped shape the future of  political Islam in
Indonesia. The first was the dispute over the formulation of  the five
principles of  the state (Pancasila) in the Jakarta Charter, particularly the
wording of  Tuhan (God) instead of  Allah (God in Islam). The second
was the so-called Madiun Affair in 1948 which revealed the friction
between devout and nominal Muslim elements in Indonesia. The third
was the Islamic state or the Darul Islam rebellion from 1948 to 1962.
The fourth was the Outer Islands rebellion in 1957 and 1958. The fifth
was the attempted coup and communal killings of  1965 and 1966. The
sixth, which remains an important indicator of  political Islam’s
strength in the early days of  the Republic, was the country’s first
election in 1955. During this period, the nation ‘struggled’ for an
identity encompassing the general sentiment to break free from the
colonial and any other dominating power (van Klinken 2009). 
In its early years, Indonesia went through a period of  liberal
democracy, but it was during Sukarno’s Guided Democracy that the
country saw the first ideological contestation between Islam and
communism. During the period of  Guided Democracy, Sukarno
attempted to equalise the three powers he thought constituted the
nation: nationalism, religion, and communism (Hefner 2000; Ramage
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1995). The failure of  an ideal balance between the three powers,
however, resulted in regional rebellions and eventually national chaos
(Herbert 2007; Ricklefs 2001), particularly marked by the struggle of
Muslim leaders and Islamic political parties to adopt sharia into the
Indonesian Constitution (Baswedan 2004:670). The chaos that ensued
inspired Sukarno to become more abrupt in his efforts to integrate
Indonesia (Herbert 2007; Ricklefs 2001). Scholars suggest that he came
to realise that Indonesia was culturally, religiously, and ethnically too
diverse to be stabilised on the foundational idea of  plurality. Sukarno’s
adoption of  so-called Guided Democracy embodied this line of
thought and led to the dissolution of  the Constitutional Assembly in
1959. 
This particular struggle between contending ideologies
resulted in the forming of  Lesbumi (the Institute for Indonesian
Muslim Arts and Culture — Lembaga Seni Budaya Muslim Indonesia),
the cultural wing of  one of  the largest Muslim organisations Nahdlatul
Ulama (NU). The organisation was formed to counter the cultural
organisation regarded as loosely aligned with the Indonesian
Communist Party, Lekra (the Institute for People’s Culture — Lembaga
Kebudayaan Rakyat) which Lesbumi criticised as utilising art as a
propaganda tool. The polarisation resulted in the Cultural Manifesto of
1963 that underlined the ‘art for art’ philosophy, to counter the ‘art for
ideology’ philosophy of  leftist aesthetics (Budianta 2007; Foulcher
1986).
It was during this period that the television system was
established to serve the desire to unite a fragmented nation. While
Lekra and Lesbumi used film to propagate ideology, Minister of
Information Maladi, who also formerly headed the Football
Association of  Indonesia (Persatuan Sepakbola Seluruh Indonesia,
PSSI), realised the value of  having ‘something in common’ as a nation.
Television, a medium symbolising modernity in more advanced
countries such as the United States, accommodated this purpose. To
achieve the objective of  national unity, the first event to be broadcast
through national television was the 1962 Asian Games. According to
Kitley (2000:23), Maladi understood how television was well suited to
the spectacle of  sports and how television could assist, both at home
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and abroad, in the symbolic definition and construction of  an
Indonesian identity. As Kitley (2000:21) explains: 
Indonesia’s first television broadcasts in August 1962, the seventeenth
commemoration of  the Declaration of  Independence and the twelve-
day coverage of  the Asian Games, are televisual icons of  the two
conflicting tendencies. The two broadcasts image a tension in the
development and use of  television in Indonesia over the last thirty
years. One event was outward-looking, populist, and self-confident and
positioned Indonesia as a modern nation, active in regional affairs. The
second revealed a more narrowly constrained, inward-looking
tendency to hold ‘the outside’ at arm’s length and construct a sense of
identity predicated on assertions of  a unique national culture and
culture space. 
This statement illustrates the problematic position of
Indonesian television at the time, and which pertains until today. With
its establishment, Maladi wanted to use television as a tool to ‘enlighten
the life of  the people of  Indonesia. It wasn’t only a matter of
knowledge — but other aspects of  life as well. The idea of  moving to
embrace modern life was important’ (Maladi, interviewed by Philip
Kitley, as cited in Kitley 2000:25). TVRI was established with this
intention. The televising of  the Asian Games was ‘national
mythmaking’ or the generating of  a ‘whole’ through media images,
since sport denies, and also reconciles, the fissures of  gender, class,
ethnicity, religion and public participation (Tomlinson and Young
2006).
Television as a tool for national unity, however, could not
afford, both technically (that is in technology, funding or human
resources) and ideologically (that is because of  the tensions between
Islam and communism), to cater to the social categories seen as part of
the diversity of  Indonesia. The main aim of  establishing a national
television was to create a ‘common ground’ or a neutral zone. 
TVRI’s representation of  Indonesia on the international stage
through the Asian Games broadcast complemented Sukarno’s
enthusiasm for ‘symbol wielding’ (Feith 1963 as cited in Kitley 2000:13)
by televising high-profile overseas trips, speech making, ceremonies,
rituals, and expenditure on the ‘insignia of  national prestige and power’
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(Kitley 2000:35). Therefore, any televised representation of  the nation
aired on TVRI during this period had been secularised and stripped off
of  any religious and/or social fragmentation challenging the unity of
the nation. Such ‘secularisation’ and ‘symbol wielding’ are fundamental
traits for TVRI under New Order’s single state television system from
1965 to 1989.
The absence of  religious representation in general and Islam
in particular cannot be separated from the characteristics of  the
television system at its infancy. The system lacked the funding, human
resources and the technology needed to produce religious
programmes. Despite that, though, the state could have appealed to the
majority of  the nation’s Muslim viewers through inventing a national
culture displaying Islamic symbols coexisting peacefully with the idea
of  nationhood. Lesbumi had attempted something of  this kind
(Chisaan 2008). 
The absence of  religious programs during the early stages of
Indonesian television also suggests that the ideological tension that
emerged through arts was not between nationalism, religion, and
communism. Instead, the tension was between Islamic ideology and
communism and, in the context of  television, this was tamed by the
medium providing a neutral zone in which national symbols were
useful. 
State television, 1965 to 19892
Several factors contributed to how Islam was positioned during the
New Order (Hefner 2000; Pringle 2010; Vickers 2005). Firstly,
economic growth, nurtured by Suharto’s ‘Western-style economic
rationality, expressed through a series of  five-year plans’ (Pringle
2010:93), reduced the number of  poor people by approximately three-
quarters, although economic inequality, and corruption, also increased
(Booth 2000:78). Secondly, economic development brought about
social change and, aided by globalisation, ‘resulted in unprecedented
intellectual ferment and an upsurge in Islamic observance already
visible by the late 1970s’ (Pringle 2010:93). Thirdly, political restrictions
which prevented the reformist Islamic leaders operating through
political parties led such leaders to exercise their influence on
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campuses. This both radicalised students and introduced pious Islam
into popular culture (Hefner 2000: 123). These three factors also
contributed to policy regarding TVRI’s function and content during
the early New Order period. An official statement from 1984 sets this
out:
The mass media will be utilized to distribute information that
promotes the political education of  the people and the development
[pengembangan] of  Indonesian identity based on Pancasila. This
recognizes the geography of  Indonesia, which makes mass media
essential for education and [the need to deliver] Pancasila education
(P4) broadcasts using role play and other means that are appealing
[menarik] but effective [efektif] primarily for school-age children and
young people. Children’s films such as Si Unyil and Huma will be
continued and used to greater advantage to plant P4 values [nilai-nilai
P4] in the young generation. In planting these values as early as
possible, it is hoped that the young generation will grow into citizens
with high levels of  national tenacity (Republik Indonesia 1984 in Kitley
2000:115). 
Television played an important role during the New Order in
terms of  the dissemination of  information and construction of  the
national identity. As often in the developing world, television was seen
as an effective tool to ‘modernise’ the identity of  the audience. Its role
during the New Order was to unite the nation as a ‘mass’, moving
towards the objectives set by the government. This idea is not exclusive
to Indonesia; many countries from the developing world have accepted
the goal of  modernisation and used media technologies in similar ways
to promote the adoption of  the ‘modern’ lifestyle — in the hope of
creating a productive working class contributing to economic
development (Kunczik 1985; Parsons 1982). Television content was
produced within this framework, with Islam playing an important
factor in inventing national culture.
In 1964, the first of  the regional TVRI stations opened in the
large cities of  Yogyakarta, Semarang, Medan, Surabaya, Makassar,
Manado, Batam, Palembang, Bali and Balikpapan. Although local
stations were permitted to dedicate two to three hours a day for local
content, what each regional station aired had to be in accordance the
policies of  TVRI central (Armando 2006). The Presidential Decree
Islam in Indonesian television, 1962 to 1998 67
Number 215 of  1963, article 4 states that TVRI is established to serve
a public function in developing the nation, in terms of  national
mental/spiritual and physical development, and forming an Indonesian
‘Social Personality’ (Leo 1972). Programme scheduling in central TVRI
was developed in accordance with this objective, aimed particularly at
developing the mental/spiritual characteristics of  the nation, for
example by airing a programme called Mimbar agama (Religious
platform).3 Although all religions acknowledged by the state received
an allocation of  time on television, the airtime for Islam was three
times the amount given to other religions. This privilege was also
apparent in the terms used within television programming.
Etymologically, the term mimbar is derived from Arabic
(minbar) and refers to the pulpit from which a preacher speaks during
Friday prayers. Like the similar term kiblat,4 it has been absorbed into
Indonesian. The use of  mimbar specifically targeted the Muslim
majority audience in Indonesia, while at the same time applying more
widely in a national context, as in Mimbar agama Kristen, Mimbar agama
Buddha, Mimbar agama Islam, even Mimbar pembangunan ([National]
development platform). The ‘naturalisation’ of  the term mimbar from
an Islamic context made it identifiable to Muslims and to those from
other religious groups. For Muslims, however, this produced a sense of
owning ‘national’ and secular culture. The Mimbar agama programmes
were aired throughout the late 1980s. Mimbar agama Islam was aired on
Thursday evenings, before the Islamic holy day of  Friday, while Mimbar
agama Kristen was aired on Sunday evenings, before the Christian holy
day of  Sunday. The block of  Mimbar agama Islam was divided into
drama programmes, Pengajian Alquran (Quranic recitation), Mimbar
Islam, and Irama qasidah (Qasidah rhythm), respectively. 
Mimbar agama Islam essentially followed the technique of
Islamic preaching (dakwah; Hasan 2002). For the next couple of
decades, TVRI generally implemented two main methods of  dakwah
(Alfandi 2010). First was the lecture method (metode ceramah) and the
second is the insertion method (metode sisipan). The first usually
involved a linear and more traditional approach to preaching where a
male preacher (dai) gave a sermon to an invisible congregation. In this
setting, there was no television audience, but the preacher referred to
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the audiences at home. The talking head format was most commonly
used by TVRI and was the core element of  the Mimbar agama Islam
block. This method is comparable to televangelism, where a minister
speaks to an extended congregation via broadcast television.
The second method of  preaching, which was most apparent in
TVRI’s religious drama shows, referred to sermons that were
incorporated into the general format of  television programmes.
Examples of  such incorporation were the insertion of  Islamic values
into music shows and traditional arts, and sometimes into drama and
film. This method was subtler in delivering sermons, which were
usually packaged as a drama programme. This method was less popular
than the first, however, as it was more expensive to produce this type
of  progamme. It was rarely produced by TVRI and, when it was, it was
usually of  poor quality. 
Religious drama programmes
The images in figure 1 appear in a report on TVRI’s programming
between 1962 and 1972 under the heading ‘From the Studio to the
Audience’, sub-heading ‘Religious Shows’.5 The caption says ‘Religious
television programmes are aired regularly by TVRI. Among others
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Figure 1. Religious drama programmes on TVRI 
Source: Leo 1972:188
through television dramas: Islamic, Christian/Catholic/Protestant,
Hindu, and Buddhist’ (Leo 1972:188). The settings displayed in both
images suggest a ‘fantasy, story-telling’ method best described as
‘embedded narrative’ (Kitley 2000:132). When dealing with highly
sensitive topics of  religion and moral guidance, Kitley (2000:132)
observes that ‘embedded narrative’ is a ‘practice that distances the
discussion of  religion as faith’.
The image on the left shows a set that includes Arab turbans
and capes, usually worn in the desert, suggesting a separate time and
place from the ‘here and now’ (Leo 1972). The image on the right,
which is described as a ‘Christian drama show’, portrays Indonesian
actors wearing a Roman military uniforms and Roman peasant clothes.
The costumes alone suggest role-playing in a non-Indonesian historical
context. 
The Muslim and Christian attributes apparent in the pictures
are similar to the case of  Si Unyil ’s ‘embedded narrative’ for Pancasila
values discussed above. Such incorporation of  religious value into
religious drama programmes ‘is told more to reveal what religious
traditions share than what makes them distinctively, doctrinally
different. It is another instance of  the practice of  acknowledging
cultural differences while erasing their specificity, which ... is an
important process in the national culture project’ (Kitley 2000:133). 
Pengajian Alquran
Pengajian Alquran (Qur’anic recitation) was scheduled before the Mimbar
agama Islam sermon and Irama qasidah. Islamic television programmes
were designed firstly to create a reverent atmosphere by showing the
reading of  the Qur’an — in Arabic and sung in a kind of  chanting
melody — followed by its literal translation to appeal to devout Muslim
audiences (Sy 1981). The show’s then director, Rahgutomo, in an
interview with Monitor TVRI, mentioned that only professionals, such
as winners of  the National Qur’anic Recitation Competition
(Musabaqah Tilawatil Qur'an/MTQ) were selected to recite the
Qur’an, but the translations were read by aspiring young adults. 
Pengajian Alquran generated the same ‘distancing’ of  a scholar
reading the Qur’an with melody (melantunkan) which requires a specific
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skill in Arabic enunciation. This sense of  the reader having
‘scholarship’ and ‘masterful skill’ created a distance from the audience
both as Muslims and as Indonesians (Sy 1981). The reader was
represented respectfully as one who understands divine scripture
without showing any direct relation to real social issues. The distance
was invented to generate a sense of  reverence, to not question the ‘holy
verses of  Qur’an’. 
The solemnity demonstrated through Qur’anic reading was
followed by the more secular reading of  its translation, using ‘normal’,
attractive teenagers whose veils hung loosely over their head and whose
arms were not covered (see figure 2). The translated verses read by
young, female Muslims both brought the Qur’anic verses closer to
more secular audiences and invited teenagers to be part of  Islamic
propagation (Sy 1981). The show’s director Rahgutomo, however,
criticised the translation readers as only seeking their 15 minutes of
fame, without truly comprehending what it is they were reading or
perfecting their art. 
Mimbar Islam
Mimbar Islam was the core of  the scheduling block. Female and male
Muslims congregated in the studio in separate groups, both facing the
preacher (Chawasi 1980). The preacher then explained how the Qur’an
provides answers for modern societal problems within the context of
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Figure 2. Pengajian Alquran on TVRI
Sources: Saleh 1981:10 and Sy 1981:10
Indonesia (Qur’anic verses were swiftly translated into Indonesian).
The preacher read out letters sent from the viewing audience and
answered questions on Islamic perspectives regarding various social
and personal issues. There is similar to the distancing apparent in
Pengajian Alquran, where the preacher is portrayed as a knowledgeable
scholar whom the audience consult. 
The preachers often had a mass following, such as the
Muhammadiyah Chairman AR Fachmuddin who filled in as a Mimbar
Islam preacher (Chawasi 1980). Fachmuddin’s sermons, for instance,
were followed by both the male and female studio audience. The
Islamic teachings articulated in Mimbar Islam were related to modern
Indonesian life through careful selection of  topics in line with TVRI’s
slogan. Letters that Fachmuddin received through the TVRI
Yogyakarta station come from various places in Indonesia. A letter
from a viewer from Magelang in East Java praised the show as being as
popular as Ketoprak Mataram (Javanese theatre). Television created a
space in which Islamic teachings were shared between Indonesian
audiences. While the effect of  Pengajian Alquran was to extend the
audiences’ willingness to follow Mimbar Islam’s interpretation of  the
Qur’an, the latter extended Islamic teachings to a greater Indonesian
audience. The Islamic programming concluded with the Irama qasidah
musical show, designed to ‘neutralise’ the seriousness of  this series of
religious programmes.
Irama qasidah
Former Minister for Women’s Empowerment and Islamic scholar
Tutty Alawiyah introduced qasidah (Persian poetry coupled with
‘Indonesian’ music) to TVRI. In a conventional qasidah show,
musicians, singers, and instrumentalists played a mixture of  Arabic and
Malayan music, often citing Islamic teachings in the lyrics and thus
containing religious messages or dakwah. The programme provided an
important outlet for Indonesian popular Islamic music (Abramson and
Kilpatrick 2006; Rasmussen 2001).
The ‘distancing from difference’ that is apparent in the
concept of  ‘embedded narrative’ is also apparent in the qasidah show
aired after Mimbar Islam. Qasidah was seen as an entertaining way to
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teach Arabic to young Indonesian Muslims (Hidayat and Nedi 1982).
The singers were dressed with light veils and Javanese kebaya (blouse)
instead of  heavy veils and unrevealing, conservative clothing creating a
sense of  a friendly, lightweight, non-dogmatic manner of  learning
religion (preferably in harmony with nationalistic notions). The duality
between the use of  music, a ‘secular’ art, and the religious message in
its teachings seem to neutralise each others’ extremes. On the one
hand, the genre of  qasidah music is less secular than rock and roll, for
instance, and on the other hand it is less reverent than the reading of
the Qur’an. During this period, TVRI also broadcast ‘secular’ artists
who performed several Islamic songs or albums, such as Bimbo’s Pop
Qasidah album, but who are mainly known for their Islamic-themed
music. Another prominent dangdut (Indonesian populist music) artist
who often appeared on TVRI is Rhoma Irama. In 1970s TVRI, music
and Islam often accompanied each other. The qasidah, like Bimbo and
Rhoma’s dangdut, is an art that is unthreatening for the pious and not
dogmatic for the nominal. 
The musical nature of  Irama qasidah — although it still
contained Islamic clothing and Arabic influence in the instruments and
method of  singing — gave the show a light or popular quality and
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Figure 3. Three members of  Patria, a qasidah group
Source: Hidayat and Nedi 1982
allowed a more diverse audience than that for the reading of  the
Qur’an. The presentation of  music with an Islamic theme also reflects
the stance of  the Indonesian government which acknowledged an
interpretation of  Islam that embraces secular culture such as music.
This is noteworthy since more conservative Muslims view music as
encouraging sinful acts (Shiloah 2003). In other words, TVRI
recognised Islamic culture as one that does not conflict with the larger
national agenda of  integration and unity. 
The aim of  TVRI in airing religious programmes was to
provide an outlet for spiritual development that was consistent with the
nation’s idea of  unity and integration, one that respects religious
pluralism and discourages prejudice (menjauhkan orang dari prasangka
keliru; Leo 1972:88–9). TVRI was to include all religions acknowledged
by the country’s law and to provide a space to realise a ‘safe difference’.
The quantity and duration of  programmes aimed at the Muslim
audience, however, exceeded those aimed at audiences of  other
religions. Mimbar agama Kristen, for instance, was aired for 15 minutes,
while the whole Islamic block lasted for 40 minutes (Leo 1972).
Christian programmes were only broadcast once a week; therefore the
different denominations, such as Adventist, had to take turns with
others, such as Catholicism. Although TVRI attempted to provide all
religions with ‘spiritually unifying’ programmes, their scheduling
demonstrated a greater effort in speaking to the more populous
Muslim audience.
Commercial television under authoritarian rule, 1989 to 1998
Indonesia’s television remained a state-controlled, single broadcasting
system until the late 1980s with information heavily regulated and the
state having absolute control in practice. Scholars generally agree that,
although various factors created a more liberal, commercial
broadcasting system, new media technologies (particularly satellite
television and video cassette rentals) performed an important role in
cultural globalisation (Kitley 2000; Sen and Hill 2000). These new
forces challenged the New Order’s tight control over information and
its hegemony over the national cultural space. In the mid-1980s, the
rising middle class promised a new audience market for business
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people close to President Suharto (Armando 2006; Loven 2008). With
exposure to foreign television programmes, the demand for quality
programmes increased — a demand which TVRI could not afford to
satisfy. The station needed alternative funding sources to finance its
programmes, and this prompted the government to consider new
strategies. 
In 1981, advertising was introduced into the initially state-
funded broadcasting system, and subsequently the industry was opened
up for commercial broadcasting and competition (Kitley 2000:216). In
1987, the government legislated the establishment of  pay TV service
for Jakarta and its surrounding areas (Kitley 2000; Sen and Hill 2000).
Access of  Indonesian viewers to transnational sources was seen to
influence the decision to allow commercial television in Indonesia (Sen
and Hill 2000; Loven 2008). The government, particularly authorities
of  the Department of  Information (Departemen Penerangan), noticed
that Indonesian viewers were turning to alternative, foreign sources.
Thus, the 1990 Ministerial Decree (Kepmen No. 111 Tahun 1990)
authorised TVRI to appoint another party, private or public, to
broadcast commercial television in Jakarta. After this decree,
commercial television stations began to proliferate (see table 1).
Although the new arrangements permitted more competition
between television stations, the regulation specified that television
programmes should be in harmony with the 1945 Constitution and
Pancasila, and should show sensitivity with potentially divisive issues
(Sen and Hill 2000:119). Critics of  the policy to privatise the television
system argued that the establishment of  commercial television
involved many people close to President Suharto. Commercial
television licences were only issued to business associates or members
of  the president’s family (Sen and Hill 2000:112). Sudwikatmono, the
owner of  SCTV, was Suharto’s cousin. Cipta Lamtoro Gung Persada,
owner of  TPI, was predominantly owned by Suharto’s first daughter
Siti Hardianti Indra Rukmana or Tutut. ANTEVE was partly owned by
Bakrie Group which had close relations to the ruling Golkar Party (Sen
and Hill 2000:112). RCTI was permitted to air terrestrially (without
decoder) only after the owner, Peter Sondakh, formed a business
relationship with Bambang Trihatmodjo, the president’s son (Loven
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2008:44). Such drastic changes to the ownership pattern of  Indonesia’s
commercial broadcasting system in the 1990s influenced the content
and formatting of  television programmes. Commercial television’s
survival relies on the profitability of  television programmes, based on
their popularity as measured by ratings. RCTI adopted strategies used
successfully by commercial television stations in other countries.6 The
approach taken by TVRI throughout the preceding years was replaced
by an ‘international’ style with no attempt to broadcast programmes of
‘public interest’, instead broadcasting ‘marketable’ programmes (Kitley
2000; Barkin 2004). 
From their emergence in the 1990s, commercial television
stations have played a more significant role than TVRI in shaping
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TV Station Owner
Operating since Target audience
PT Rajawali Citra Televisi (RCTI) Bimantara Citra Group and
24 August 1989 Rajawali Wira Bhakti Utama Group
(restricted to Jakarta); 
24 August 1993 (nationwide) Urban middle and upper class
----------
PT Surya Citra Televisi (SCTV) Sudwikatmono
17 January 1990 
(restricted to Surabaya); 
24 August 1993 (nationwide) Urban middle and upper class
----------
PT Cipta Televisi Pendidikan Cipta Lamtoro Gung Persada
Indonesia (TPI)
23 January 1991 Middle and lower class
----------
PT Cakrawala Andalas Televisi Bakrie Group & Hasmuda Group
(ANTEVE)
28 March 1993 Urban youth
----------
PT Indosiar Visual Mandiri Salim Group
(INDOSIAR)
11 January 1995 Urban middle and upper class
Table 1. Commercial television stations operating in Indonesia in 1998
Source: Loven 2008:45
public perceptions of  Islam. While TVRI’s absolute control over
religious content in television restrained production creativity,
commercial television producers of  entertainment programmes
avoided religious issues to the extent that characters had no identifiable
religion or ethnic background (Barkin 2004:243). The survival of
commercial television relies on profitability of  television programmes
based on its popularity, measured by ratings. And to do so, private,
commercial television stations use strategies proven by commercial
television stations in other countries, such as predictable scheduling. 
With a selection of  internationally successful, but cheap,
programmes, private stations imagined their audience as a sophisticated
elite with a materialistic lifestyle and an interest in world events. The
broadcast US television programmes, however, received low ratings.
This suggested that targeting an upper-middle class segment of
audience does not necessarily identify with US, global culture. In fact,
the audience in Surabaya was outraged when the Canadian programme
Wok with Yan presented a segment that demonstrated a recipe including
pork fat at the beginning of  Ramadan 1991 (Kitley 2000:102). The
main concern was that such protests, and those led by hardline
Islamists (Wardhana 2002 as cited in Barkin 2004:246),7 would stir
unrest in the larger Muslim population, which is the audience targeted
by the commercial television stations. The potential risk of  offending
the large Muslim audience set precedents for avoiding anything that
goes against ‘conservative’ Islam. This was the turning point at which
the commercial interest of  private television stations fed into the rising
Islamism that had been advocated initially by small Muslim groups.
This led to the main difference between TVRI and the young
commercial television stations. The latter feared appearing too secular
or being perceived as disrespectful towards Islam, as is apparent in their
responses to protests against foreign television programmes that
conflicted with audience perceptions of  Islam. Private stations took
preventive measures by producing Islamic-themed television
programmes, such as the evening call to prayers (adzan magrib) and
sermons (teledakwah). This was a combination of  corporate social
responsibility (Barkin 2004:246) and public relations. All stations now
announce the call of  prayer five times a day and broadcast the complete
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evening call to prayer (adzan magrib) every day. All stations feature a
variety of  Muslim prayer shows, usually early in the morning. These
prayer shows are often accompanied by preachers, not unlike those
aired by TVRI for decades. On one hand, in their ‘deep risk aversion’
(Barkin 2004), television stations have become complacent towards
vocal Islamists. On the other, in continuing to produce the ‘least
objectionable’ programmes (Klein and Morgensen 1979; Cantor 1971),
television stations reproduce a version of  Islamic practice that is based
on risk-avoidance. This raises the question of  whether or not
programmes genuinely appeal to the largest audience.
Dakwah programmes
Traditionally, dakwah programmes, or teledakwah, were televised
derivations of  the dakwah method, featuring a Muslim cleric talking
directly to the camera (as a ‘talking head’), or sometimes to an
‘interviewer’ as if  to confirm the credibility of  the cleric being
someone revered enough to have authority on religious matters. In
order to add to its visual appeal, the cleric often stands before a studio
audience or in a mosque, talking with a generally sombre tone (Alfandi
2010; Barkin 2004; Howell 2008). 
In 1997, TVRI’s Mimbar agama Islam was renamed and
redesigned Hikmah pagi (Morning wisdom). The formatting became
more attractive and dynamic in an apparent attempt to compete with
commercial television’s packaging of  Islamic-themed television
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Figure 4. Dakwah programmes
Left: Quraish Shihab in Kultum (RCTI) Right: Hikmah pagi (TVRI)
programmes. The remodelled format now included more than one
speaker in a talk show format, as well as interaction with the audience
who could call to the studio line and ask direct questions to the
preacher. There was even a Qur’anic recitation competition via
telephone. 
For commercial television stations, however, dakwah
programmes received very poor ratings, with the stations claiming they
broadcast them out of  a sense of  public service and moral
responsibility (Astuti 2005; Barkin 2004). While some types of
commercial programmes have been criticised by psychologists and
educationists as impeding intellectual and psychological development,
religious shows are seen to neutralise the negative effects of
Indonesian television (Purnomo 1998:6). Barkin cites Tsing’s (2001)
‘economy of  appearances’ and argues that commercial television
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Station Programme Day and time
SCTV Di ambang fajar Daily 5.00 to 5.30 a.m.
(On the brink of  sunrise)
RCTI Hikmah fajar Daily 5.30 to 6.00 a.m.
(The wisdom of  sunrise)
Penyegaran rohani Islam Friday 8.00 to 8.30 a.m.
(Islamic spiritual revival)
TPI Kuliah subuh Daily 5.30 to 6.00 a.m.
(Subuh lectures)
IIS Islam Daily 11.30 a.m. to 12.00 noon
(Islam IIS)
ANTEVE Mutiara subuh Daily 5.30 to 6.00 a.m.
(The pearl of  subuh)
INDOSIARFajar imani Saturday & Sunday 5.30 to 6.00 a.m.
(Spiritual sunrise)
TVRI Hikmah pagi Sunday 7.00 to 7.30 a.m.
(Morning wisdom)
Source: adapted from Purnomo, 1998
Table 2. Dakwah shows aired by Indonesian television stations in 1997
stations are attempting to reassure religious organisations by
‘performing’ a certain amount of  religiosity and, by doing so, taking
pre-emptive measures to bring outspoken conservatives into a
negotiable relationship (Barkin 2004:245). Although the placement of
the programmes coincided with Islamic rituals such as sunrise prayers
(subuh) and on Fridays (the holy day), the dakwah programmes were
carefully placed outside the prime time hours of  6.00 p.m. to 10.00
p.m.; while risks were averted, this was at minimal cost. 
Despite their weak commercial appeal, ratings indicate that
these shows do have a following and the preachers in such shows claim
that those who get up to watch the shows are demonstrating their
commitment to their subuh prayers (Astuti 2005; Barkin 2004; Purnomo
1998). The programmes provide a medium for Islamic preachers,
scholars, and intellectuals to reach out to a devoted audience from
geographical areas otherwise unreachable. The spread of  Islamic
preaching in Indonesia before the advent of  television was based on
locality and focused on local areas with preachers sometimes using
local dialects (Chamin and Baidhawy 2003; Liddle 1996). The presence
of  television has allowed these preachers to reach a national audience,
creating new bonds and fraternity between Muslim audiences and
potentially overriding the specificity of  local culture, or perhaps
introducing local culture to national contexts. 
Islam in sinetron
The industry furthermore sought ways to make Islamic programmes
profitable. In 1998, successful Indonesian television producer Raam
Punjabi (originally from India and a self-proclaimed Hindu) came up
with the idea of  trying out an ‘Islamic’ sinetron. Having a television
production background in India, he was skilled at producing quality
entertainment television programmes. The unique trait of  this sinetron
was that instead of  being shown weekly according to conventional
scheduling, a new episode would be broadcast daily during the month
of  Ramadan — a whole year’s worth of  shows was thus televised in
four weeks and strategically aired just as the day’s fast-breaking meal
was ending to catch the imagined Muslim family at just the right time,
with just the right sort of  show (Barkin 2004:255). 
80 Inaya Rakhmani
One of  the issues faced by Punjabi’s production house,
MultiVision Plus (MVP), was how the practice of  Islam could be
depicted in a sinetron while maintaining a popular appeal. Which kind of
Islam could be shown? Should the characters wear a jilbab (head
covering), for instance? The producers finally agreed to depict an Islam
that was not physical, one that was distinct and non-confrontational so
that ‘even Christians would enjoy it’ (Barkin 2004:257). In figure 5, for
instance, the main actress, Krisdayanti, is not wearing a jilbab and
kissing the back of  her husband’s hand. Such practice is symbolic of
the subservience of  a wife to her husband and is practised by pious
Indonesian Muslims. The early development of  Islamic sinetron seems
to reflect TVRI’s representation of  diversity without focusing on its
specificity. Thus universal values such as love and compassion
overshadowed specific Islamic teachings and rituals, but were apparent
enough for Muslims to identify with, such as the common practice of
a wife kissing her husband’s hand. 
At the height of  the economic and political crisis in 1998,
Punjabi skilfully identified an audience and subsequently produced the
first religiously themed sinetron. MVP’s Doaku harapanku (My hopes, my
dreams) was aired during the month of  Ramadan. This led to copycat
programmes from every other commercial television station the
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Figure 5. Still from Doaku harapanku (My hopes, my dreams) 1998
following year. The presentation of  Islamic themes in sinetron ended the
industry’s long avoidance of  popular television programmes with
religious themes. In later years and the Ramadan sinetron became
comfortably positioned during the prime time, the visual
representation of  Islamic teachings became more apparent. In figure 6,
the female protagonist of  Di atas sajadah cinta (I bow with love) (2006)
wears a multicoloured modern jilbab, as was fashionable in the 2000s.
It is also worth noting that the way in which it is tied around the neck
is unique to Indonesian Muslims, particularly in large, cosmopolitan
cities (Hefner 2007).
By 1998, commercial television stations had developed new
ways of  representing Islam in Indonesian television. The commercial
logic, under which the industry worked, was the main factor in
determining how programmes were conceptualised, which audience
they targeted, and for what purpose. The Islamic cultural trends that
developed in urban societies, particularly cities monitored by AGB
Nielsen, was the main reference for television producers in deciding
this (H Achmad, personal interview, 8 July 2011). Islamic themes in
television programmes are common in Indonesia today. The
mainstreaming of  Islam that the country is experiencing today reflects
the commercial interests of  post-authoritarian society. 
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Figure 6. Di atas sajadah cinta (I bow with love) 2006
Conclusion
Across the last fifty years, there have been clear connections between
the historical context of  Islam within the political arrangements of  the
time and the system within which television operated. Islam has been
useful for those controlling television to tap into the potential audience
of  Muslims. 
TVRI’s early airing of  international sports events was initially
seen as a reinforcement of  national symbols, while the absence of
religious representation during this period was related to the ideological
contestation between nationalism, religion, and communism. The
infant TVRI was designed to become a national unifier, in which
nationalistic imagery was useful in taming the tension between Islamic
ideology and communism.
After 1965, TVRI provided a single, state television system
which was used to disseminate information aimed at developing
Indonesian identity based on the country’s fundamental principles
(Pancasila). In this period, all religions acknowledged by the state
received slots on TVRI. Islamic representations during this period were
carefully arranged to support the New Order’s national culture.
Although Islamic teachings were accommodated by TVRI, it was
within the context of  a Muslim, national audience.
This accommodation gradually shifted from 1989 onwards
when the single, state television system shifted into a commercial
system and as competition between television stations ended TVRI’s
dominance over televised information and entertainment. Government
policies that regulated the television system sided with the business
interest of  its owners. In this period, young, commercial television
stations averted risk by not appearing too secular for their majority
Muslim audience while remaining acceptable for a heterogeneous
audience. Although not directly profitable through high ratings,
private television stations aired shows with Islamic themes as a
form of  corporate social responsibility (Barkin 2004). The
television stations and content providers interpreted the public
protests against US-produced global shows that were insensitive
towards Islam as market demand to produce programmes with
Islamic themes. 
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By the end of  the 1990s, Islamic representation started to
appear in soap operas. Competition between television stations urged
them to reconsider the market potential of  Muslim audiences, which
during this period was also interlinked with the rising political
influences of  Muslim intellectuals (Hefner 1997). It is true that the
more recent trend of  Islamic commodification occurred in relation to
broader Islamic manifestations in personal piety; political, social and
legal expressions of  Islam; and the rising Islamic economy within the
Indonesian context (Fealy and White 2008). Even before this, however,
and the problematic ‘conservative Islamic turn’ in the 1990s (van
Buinessen 2013), Islamic representations had enjoyed a privileged
position. Alongside, or perhaps together with, what van Bruinessen
highlights as doctrinal changes, the mainstreaming of  Islam in
Indonesian television is also related to Islam’s value in providing
political and/or economic commodities in the interest of  those in
power.
Inaya Rakhmani is a Media Studies lecturer at the Department of
Communication Science, University of  Indonesia and an Associate at the Asia
Research Centre, Murdoch University in Perth. Her email is:
inaya.rakhmani@gmail.com.
Notes
1. Examples of  religious groups not acknowledged by the state, despite its
common practices in its particular area, are the Javanese Kejawen,
Sundanese Wiwitan, Torajan Aluk To Dolo, and Dayak Kaharingan. No
reliable statistics are available for the amount of  followers, because some
followers continue to practice their ‘old religion’ by marrying it with ‘new
religion’ such as Hindu Kaharingan (Schiller 1996:409).
2. Some scholars argue that Suharto did not gain presidential status until 1967
(Vatikotis 1998; Walangitang 2003), but his move for power is generally
accepted as marked from the ‘attempted coup’ (Pringle 2010:81).
3. In this section, I specifically refer to TVRI central’s programming.
4. Kiblat, the direction of  prayer for Muslims, is also widely used to refer to a
political affiliation and/or ideology. In a sentence such as, ‘Politisi itu berkiblat
kemana?’ (What is the orientation of  that politician?) the religious meaning
of  the word is replaced with a connotation of  unquestioned devotion
towards a certain cause.
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5. The book is a report on TVRI’s programming between 1962 and 1972,
published by the Television Directorate under the Ministry of  Information.
This section is sourced from the decade report as well as Monitor TVRI
magazines. The heading ‘From the Studio to the Audience’ reminds one of
the expression ‘From the People, For the People and to the People’, which
was a New Order slogan commonly repeated by TVRI. 
6. Eastman and Ferguson (2009) gives a practical overview of  the current
strategies in global media programming.
7. Such protests and industry capitulation to hardline Islamists were still
occurring in 2011. This is seen, for example, the response of  the Islamic
Defenders Front (FPI) to the airing the pluralist film Tanda tanya (Question
mark) and the submission of  SCTV to this protest (Putri 2012).
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